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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
and less the fair rental value of the land. The latter case stated
that the vendor may not retain any part of the purchase money
greater than the difference between the contract price and the
actual value, as he may not profit by the purchaser's misfortune in
being unable to complete the agreement.
Illustrating the law's opposition to forfeiture and penalties is
the case of Freedman v. St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d
629 (1951). There it was held that if the denial of part restitution
of the down payment would result in the imposition of punitive
damages even a defaulting purchaser is entitled to relief.
Cases denying restitution can be justified on one or more of
the following grounds: (1) defendant has not rescinded and is
ready willing and able to perform; (2) plaintiff has not shown that
the injury caused by his breach is less than the installments paid;
or (3) there is a genuine and valid liquidated damages provision in
the contract stating that defendant may retain money so paid in
part performance. If none of these justifications exists-restitution
should be allowed. See Corbin, Right of Defaulting Vendee to the
Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
In permitting restitution to a defaulting vendee the courts, of
course, should not be unmindful of the rights of the vendor arising
out of the contract. On the contrary "every contractual right of
the vendor should be scrupulously preserved, but in cutting the
pound of flesh no blood must be shed." Melberg v. Bough, 62
Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).
C. F. S., Jr.
WILLS-VOID RFsIDUARY-INTEsTAcY-RIGHT OF NONRENOUNCING
SPOUSE To SHARE.-Testatrix died leaving a will which devised a
life estate in designated realty to her surviving husband, with a
remainder over. The husband died without having renounced the
will. The administrator of the testatrix sued for a construction of
the will. Upon petition, nearest blood relatives of the testatrLx
were granted leave to intervene and file an answer and cross bill.
The trial court, after holding the remainder void, declared that
the husband being the paramount heir at law, took the remainder
which passed by intestacy. Interveners appealed. Held, that a
spouse who is a paramount heir under the descent and distribution
statutes does not waive his right to intestate property, resulting
from failure of the residuary clause, by failing to renounce the will.
Harmer v. Boggess, 73 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1952).
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The case is one of first impression in West Virginia. There-
fore, comment will be confined primarily to the purposes of our
descent and distribution and renunciatory statutes, the effect of
these statutes as interpreted in the light of the present holding,
and finally the position which our court has taken in relation to
that taken in other jurisdictions.
At first blush there appears to be a repugnancy between and
among our statutes of descent and distribution, the statute of
renunciation, and provision in lieu of dower. W. VA. CODE C. 42,
art. 1, § 1 (Michie, 1949) provides: "When any person having title
to any real estate of inheritance shall die intestate as to such estate,
it shall descend and pass in parcenary to his kindred, male and
female, in the following course: . . . If there be no child, nor
descendant of any child, nor father, nor mother, the whole shall
go to the wife or husband of the intestate. . ." [Italics supplied].
Article 2, section 1 of the same chapter provides: "When any
person shall die intestate as to his personal estate or any part
thereof, the surplus ... shall pass and be distributed to and among
the same persons, and in the same proportions, that real estate
is directed to descend, except as follows: (a) If the intestate was a
married woman, ... and if she leaves no issue, . . . her husband
shall be entitled to the whole thereof. . ." [Italics supplied].
W. VA. CODE c. 42, art. 3, § 1 (Michie, 1949) provides for re-
nunciation of a will by a wife or husband; and, ". . . if such
renunciation be made, or if no provision be made, ... such surviv-
ing wife or husband shall have such share in the real and personal
estate of the decedent as such surviving wife or husband would have
taken if the decedent had died intestate leaving children: otherwise
the surviving wife or husband shall have no more of the decedent's
estate than is given by the will." Article 3, section 2 of the same
chapter provides, "If a person make provision by will for his or her
surviving wife or husband, such provision shall be construed to be
in lieu and bar of dower and distributive share ... and such pro-
vision, unless the same be renounced . .. shall be all that such
surviving wife or husband shall take of the estate . . .. unless it
clearly appears .. . that the testator intended . . . ." otherwise.
[Italics supplied].
It would appear that the primary purpose of the statute on
renunciation is to guarantee a spouse a minimum share of the
property, which share cannot be defeated by the will of the other
spouse. By its very context it presupposes the existence of a will.
Freeman v. Freeman, 61 W. Va. 683, 57 S.E. 292 (1907).
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The doctrine of election is the medium through which a renun-
ciation is effected, and is predicated on the assumption that a
widow or widower who by asserting a right to take under the will
confirms the will and should not be permitted to claim a right in-
consistent with its provisions which would operate to disaffirm
and defeat it. Shuman v. Shuman, 9 W. Va. 595 (1876); Jacob v.
Jacob, 100 W. Va. 595, 131 S.E. 449 (1926).
It would seem, therefore, that the basic purpose of guarantee-
ing a minimum share of the property would not prevent a surviving
spouse from succeeding to intestate property. Nor would the
doctrine of election operate to defeat the will, in that it has
reference only to property covered by the will, since by claiming
property not covered by the will the spouse does not in any way
disaffirm or defeat the will; since under the election statute the
surviving spouse either takes under the will or if he elects to re-
nounce, takes that which is bestowed by virtue of the marital
rights. In contrast there is no election as to property passing under
the statutes of inheritance. As expressed in Rau v. Krepps, 101
W. Va. 344, 133 S.E. 508 (1926), "One entitled to any benefit under
a will or other instrument, must if he claims that benefit, abandon
every right and interest the assertion of which would defeat even
partially any provision of that instrument." This language is
indicative of an alternative right to property disposed of by a will,
and not otherwise. It is submitted that the design of these sections
is confined in function and application to a will.
American statutes of inheritance have as their purpose the
equitable transmission of title to property among the heirs upon
the death of the owner intestate, or partially intestate. Daniel v.
Whartenby, 17 Wall. 639 (U.S. 1873). This is considered to be
as much as the intestate would have given had he contemplated
the disposition. Garwols v. Bankers' Trust, 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W.
239 (1930).
Our court cited Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 21 Atl. 1075
(1891), as purporting to state the minority view. The court there
held that the surviving spouse had no interest in intestate property,
reasoning that, "It was plainly not the intention of the testator
that . . . [his widow] should have any other share in his estate,
for he evidently did not contemplate that any part of it would
become intestate estate." The Connecticut court has since said
that when the will is equally susceptible of two constructions, one
in favor of the heir and the other in favor of some more distant rela-
tive, the one in favor of the heir will be preferred. Pendleton v. Lar-
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rabee, 62 Conn. 393, 26 At. 482 (1892). As was said in Walker v.
Parker, 13 Pet. 166 (U.S. 1839), every reasonable construction in the
will must be made in favor of the heir at law; an heir can only be
disinherited by clear and express terms.
In Jackson's Appeal, 126 Pa. 105, 17 Atl. 535 (1899), where the
wife died without electing to take under the will, the court denied
her the right to the intestate property, reasoning that since she
did not elect she must be presumed to have taken under the will,
and as to her there was no intestacy of any portion. Although this
case was not cited, our court intimates by its opinion that a similar
argument was proposed, which in effect would leave the surviving
husband without any right as to intestate property. In Cain v.
Barnell, 124 Miss. 860, 87 So. 484 (1921) where the survivor did
renounce, the court held such a renunciation statute applies only
to property devised and bequeathed under the will, and does not
limit the survivor's right to inherit property not disposed of by the
will. It is submitted that any other result would be punitive and
unjustified.
If there is a conflict in the statutes, there is nothing in the
statutes themselves which would indicate that one should prevail
over the other in such event, nor any provision that if the spouse
take under the will, he will be barred from sharing in intestate
property. When the statutes are doubtful, they ought to be inter-
preted to reach a result most consonant to equity. In the light
thereof, the legislature, it seems, would not capriciously nullify such
a basic right of inheritance without distinct specification of their
intent to do so.
It would seem that our court was correct in its holding that a
surviving spouse who is paramount heir takes the intestate property
under the statutes of inheritance; and, that this basic and funda-
mental right is not to be defeated by other statutes dealing with
renunciation and intention of the testator, unless such statutes
clearly state otherwise.
B. A. G.
WRONGFUL D-ATH-LiABILiTy OF HUSBAND IF WIFE SOLE BENE-
FICIARY.-Action by P as administrator of deceased for wrongful
death caused by D's negligence. D, the son-in-law of deceased,
claims that any recovery would go to his wife, as sole beneficiary
of the deceased's estate, and that the action is in reality one by a
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